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I. INTRODUCTION 
At the height of the economic recession in 2010, over 2.9 million 
foreclosure actions were initiated nationally.1 While the economy has 
improved, the foreclosure crisis lingers. Millions of Americans will face 
foreclosure in 2014.2 The U.S. government responded by implementing 
the Home Affordable Mortgage Program (HAMP), a Treasury-sponsored 
initiative that aims to prevent foreclosure by encouraging mortgage loan 
servicers to modify the mortgages of qualified homeowners.3 The Treas-
ury Department has extended HAMP multiple times—from its original 
ending date in 2013 to its present ending date in 2016.4  
While HAMP has indeed helped homeowners avoid foreclosure, 
the program has spawned an array of litigation as servicer misconduct 
runs rampant.5 As the Ninth Circuit recently noted, “the [HAMP] pro-
gram seems to have created more litigation than it has happy homeown-
ers.”6 Litigation has had varying success for homeowners. Courts were 
initially reluctant to enforce Treasury directives regarding HAMP. 7 
However, evolving case law has required a shift in strategy for home-
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 1. Les Christie, Foreclosures Hit Six-Year Low in 2013, CNN MONEY (Jan. 16, 2014, 1:16 
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/01/16/real_estate/foreclosure-crisis/. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See generally John R. Chiles & Matthew T. Mitchell, HAMP: An Overview of the Program 
and Recent Litigation Trends, 65 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 194 (2011). 
 4. Secretary Lew Unveils New Efforts to Assist Struggling and Prospective Homeowners, Pro-
vide More Affordable Options for Renters, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY  (June 26, 2014), http:// 
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2444.aspx. 
 5. Paul Kiel, Bank of America Lied to Homeowners and Rewarded Foreclosures, Former Em-
ployees Say, PROPUBLICA (June 14, 2013), http://www.propublica.org/article/bank-of-america-lied-
to-homeowners-and-rewarded-foreclosures. 
 6. Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 728 F.3d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 7. See generally Williams v. Timothy F. Geithner, No. 09-1959 ADM/JJG, 2009 WL 3757380 
(D. Minn. Nov. 9, 2009). 
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owners to litigate under common law devices and state statutory law, 
such as consumer protection acts.8 When servicers violate HAMP Guide-
lines, courts should afford homeowners legal recourse after the home-
owner brings a consumer protection act claim against the servicer. 
Part II of this Comment provides a brief overview of HAMP, in-
cluding an explanation of the loan modification process. In Part III, the 
history of HAMP litigation is explored, from its weak beginnings to the 
mixed success of current claims. Finally, this Comment analyzes how 
homeowners can successfully litigate HAMP claims using consumer pro-
tection acts and how courts should respond to servicers’ challenges to 
these claims. 
II. THE HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM 
As part of the 2008 bailout of the financial industry, the Bush Ad-
ministration passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) 
of 2008,9 which authorized the creation of the Making Home Affordable 
Program (MHA)—an initiative intended to stabilize the housing market 
and provide relief for homeowners.10 As part of the MHA, the Treasury 
Department introduced HAMP.11 The purpose of HAMP is to reduce the 
number of foreclosures by encouraging beneficiaries and servicers to 
modify mortgages for homeowners at risk of default or already in default 
on their mortgage loan.12 Guidelines issued by the Treasury Department 
(HAMP Guidelines) set procedures and rules for participating servicers.13 
While the Obama Administration originally estimated that this program 
could benefit up to four million homeowners, there were only 939,008 
active permanent HAMP loan modifications as of February 2014.14 This 
Part explores the roles of HAMP participants, the benefits of HAMP for 
homeowners, and the process of HAMP loan modification. 
                                                          
 8. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 198–200. 
 9. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201–5253 (2008). 
 10 . MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM, HANDBOOK FOR SERVICERS OF NON-GSE 
MORTGAGES, VERSION 4.4, at 14 (2014) [hereinafter MHA HANDBOOK], available at 
https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/hamp_servicer/mhahandbook_44.pdf. 
 11. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 194. 
 12. Id. at 194–95. 
 13. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 14. 
 14. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 194; U.S. DEP’T  OF THE TREASURY, MAKING HOME 
AFFORDABLE PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH FEBRUARY 2014 (2014) [hereinafter 
HAMP SUMMARY], available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/ 
Documents/February%202014%20MHA%20Report%20final.pdf. 
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A. HAMP Participants 
HAMP creates a relationship between the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, participating servicers, and homeowners whose residence is 
secured by a mortgage.15 The Treasury Department oversees all MHA 
programs and publishes the HAMP Guidelines that regulate the loan 
modification process.16 
Both government-sponsored entities (GSEs), including Freddie 
Mac and Fannie Mae, and non-government-sponsored entities (non-
GSEs) participate in HAMP.17 Non-GSEs participate in HAMP voluntar-
ily,18 and typically do so because they received Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP) funds during the 2008 financial industry bailout. 19  
Non-GSEs, including Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and JP Morgan 
Chase, commit to following HAMP Guidelines through signing a Ser-
vicer Participation Agreement (SPA) that imposes contractual obliga-
tions on the servicer to consider all eligible loans for MHA programs 
unless otherwise prohibited.20 HAMP participants service approximately 
89% of all first-lien mortgages.21 
Homeowners must fit a narrow set of criteria to qualify for a 
HAMP loan modification.22 This Comment only examines HAMP Tier 1 
modifications as these are the oldest, most common, and as such, the 
most widely litigated type of HAMP modifications. Basic criteria for a 
HAMP Tier 1 modification include: (1) the mortgage is a first-lien loan 
originating on or before January 1, 2009; (2) the homeowner has a doc-
umented financial hardship; (3) the mortgage loan is secured by a single 
family property; (4) the mortgage loan was not previously modified un-
der HAMP; (5) the mortgage loan is in default or “default is reasonably 
foreseeable”; (6) the residence is owner-occupied; and (7) the homeown-
er’s current monthly mortgage payment is greater than 31% of his gross 
monthly income.23 These criteria exclude a number of homeowners, in-
cluding those who have less conventional sources of income or are un-
                                                          
 15. See MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 14. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18 . Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/housing/mha/Pages/ 
hamp.aspx (last updated July 22, 2012, 2:26 PM). 
 19. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 195. 
 20. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 23. Exceptions to SPA include pooling and servicing 
agreements (PSAs). Id. PSAs govern the relationship between beneficiaries and servicers. Id. 
 21. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 195. 
 22. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 71–79. 
 23. Id. at 72–73. 
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employed.24 However, these homeowners may qualify under other MHA 
programs, including the Home Affordable Unemployment Program, the 
Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives Program, or other foreclosure 
alternatives, including in-house modifications, short sales, or deed-in-
lieu.25 Even homeowners who meet the HAMP criteria are not guaran-
teed a loan modification, as the process requires a substantial amount of 
further effort by both the homeowner and the servicer. 
B. Benefits of HAMP Participation for Homeowners 
Participation in HAMP provides several advantages to homeowners 
that are unavailable outside of the HAMP context. Perhaps the most im-
portant benefit is that once a homeowner submits a complete loan modi-
fication application26 to the servicer, the servicer may not begin or con-
tinue foreclosure proceedings.27 Discontinuation of foreclosure proceed-
ings is valuable as it gives the homeowner additional time in his resi-
dence and allows him time to explore alternatives to foreclosure. Another 
advantage of HAMP is increased transparency in the communication 
process between homeowners and servicers.28 HAMP Guidelines provide 
that servicers must assign homeowners a “single point of contact”—an 
employee of the servicer that the homeowner can contact for information 
regarding their loan modification application.29 HAMP Guidelines also 
specify that the servicer must provide certain notices to the homeowner, 
including when an application is considered complete and whether the 
loan modification has been approved.30 This more open system of com-
munication is imperfect at best, but it provides the homeowner with some 
important notices, such as when the application has been received. Final-
ly, a servicer cannot charge a homeowner any fees to be considered for a 
loan modification.31 These benefits are unique to HAMP, and as such, it 
places homeowners on a more even playing field with servicers. 
                                                          
 24. For example, a less conventional source of income is a charitable contribution by a church 
to a homeowner. This cannot be considered during a HAMP modification, even if properly docu-
mented. Id. at 105. 
 25. Id. at 15. These options are beyond the scope of this paper and will not be discussed fur-
ther. 
 26. Servicers can reject homeowners on the grounds that their application is incomplete, but 
HAMP Guidelines do not require the servicer to describe how the application is “incomplete.”  
 27. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 89–92. 
 28. See id. at 79. 
 29. Id. at 64. 
 30. Id. at 79–88. 
 31. Id. at 80. 
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C. The HAMP Loan Modification Process 
The HAMP loan modification process typically starts when the 
homeowner submits a loan modification application.32 The servicer then 
performs a two-step analysis to consider whether the homeowner is eli-
gible for a loan modification: (1) the waterfall approach, and (2) the Net 
Present Value (NPV) test.33 Next, servicers offer approved homeowners 
a trial period plan (TPP) to ensure homeowners are able to make the 
modified monthly mortgage payments before a permanent loan modifica-
tion is offered.34 Completion of the entire process may span anywhere 
from a few months to a few years.35 
1. The Loan Modification Application 
Homeowners must submit a complete loan modification application 
to their mortgage loan servicer for consideration.36 This application in-
cludes forms required by HAMP Guidelines, documentation of income, 
personal expenses worksheets, and tax returns.37 Income may come from 
several sources, including salary/hourly wages, social security benefits, 
spousal and domestic support, rental income, income from a business, 
and support from other members of the household.38 However, unem-
ployment benefits are not considered as acceptable income under 
HAMP.39 Income is consistently a problem for homeowners, as many 
homeowners default after experiencing a loss of income.40 It is typical 
for homeowners to send several loan modification applications to ser-
vicers, as servicers can deny applications for being untimely or incom-
plete.41 Many loan applications result in a paper chase, where the servicer 
                                                          
 32. Id. at 92–100. 
 33. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 3. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See, e.g., Morris v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 775 F. Supp. 2d 255, 256–57 (D. 
Mass. 2011) (stating that homeowners submitted applications in January and February 2010 and 
commenced litigation two months later). But see In re JPMorgan Chase Mortg. Modification Litig., 
880 F. Supp. 2d 220, 228 (D. Mass. 2012) (alleging that the homeowner applied for a modification 
starting May 2009 and was denied 14 months later); Sutcliffe v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 283 F.R.D. 
533, 537–39 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (alleging that homeowners’ loan modification process started in 2009 
and continued through December 2011). 
 36. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 92. 
 37. Id. at 100–05. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 105. 
 40. See Chris Fleisher, HAMP Limitations Frustrate Homeowners Trying to Avoid Foreclo-
sure, TRIBLIVE (Sept. 6, 2014, 9:00 PM), http://triblive.com/business/headlines/6659825-74/hamp-
program-mortgage#axzz3DhrvcFyS. 
 41. See, e.g., Sutcliffe, 238 F.R.D. at 537–39 (alleging that homeowner submitted several loan 
modification applications). 
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continually asks for additional or updated paperwork, extending the loan 
modification process and having many homeowners rack up the amount 
in arrears.42 
Once the servicer does determine that the application is complete, it 
forwards the application to its underwriting department for review.43 The 
review consists of the four to five-step waterfall approach, followed by 
the NPV test. 
2. The Waterfall Approach 
The overall goal of a loan modification is to bring the homeowner 
current on their mortgage loan and to lower the homeowner’s mortgage 
payment to a target of 31% of their current monthly income.44 Servicers’ 
underwriters use a waterfall approach to reach the target payment. The 
analysis generally involves up to five steps: (1) capitalization; (2) interest 
rate reduction; (3) term extension; (4) principal forbearance; and (5) 
principal reduction alternative.45 
First, the mortgage loan is capitalized.46 A servicer “capitalizes ac-
crued interest, out-of-pocket escrow advances to third parties, and any 
required escrow advances that will be paid to third parties by the ser-
vicer.”47 The servicer also capitalizes any “servicing advances that are 
made for costs and expenses incurred in performing servicing obliga-
tions” such as foreclosure fees.48 Capitalization brings the mortgage cur-
rent and out of default.49 If the new monthly mortgage payment after cap-
italization is not equal to or less than 31% of the homeowner’s monthly 
income, the underwriter moves to lower the interest rate.50 
Next, the interest rate of the mortgage is lowered in increments of 
.0125% until the 31% target payment is met, or until the interest rate falls 
to the floor rate of 2.0%.51 This step is especially beneficial to homeown-
ers who have an adjustable-rate mortgage as the interest rate becomes 
fixed for the lifetime of the loan.52 Then, if necessary, the servicer ex-
                                                          
 42. Arrears is the total amount past due, or rather, the total amount a homeowner would need to 
pay to become current on their mortgage loan. 
 43. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 107. 
 44. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 196. 
 45. Id. 
 46. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 111. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 196. 
 51. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 111–12. 
 52. See id. at 112. 
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tends the term of the loan up to 480 months.53 If the 31% target is not 
met by term extension, the fourth step in the waterfall process is a princi-
pal forbearance.54 Principal forbearances55 do not accrue interest, but the 
amount forborn will be due upon transfer of property or maturity of the 
mortgage loan, whichever occurs first.56 A possible fifth step is principal 
forgiveness, where the servicer forgives part of the mortgage loan in or-
der to allow the homeowner to qualify for HAMP.57 This is not required 
by HAMP, and as a result, the majority of HAMP loan modifications do 
not include principal forgiveness.58 
If the monthly mortgage payment cannot be reduced to the 31% 
target payment by the four steps in the waterfall approach, and the ser-
vicer is unwilling to forgive part of the unpaid principal balance, then the 
application will be denied.59 On the other hand, if the monthly mortgage 
payment is reduced to the 31% threshold through the waterfall approach, 
then the underwriter moves to the NPV test.60 
3. The NPV Test 
Generally, NPV is the value of an investment over time.61 In this 
context, underwriters use NPV to calculate the value of the mortgage 
loan under two different scenarios: (1) if the homeowner receives a loan 
modification, and (2) if the servicer forecloses on the property instead.62 
The NPV considers a variety of inputs: homeowner income, current 
property value, risk of redefault, etc.63 After calculating these inputs, the 
underwriter has the value of the mortgage loan under each of the two 
alternatives.64 If the NPV for the modified mortgage is higher than the 
NPV for the nonmodified mortgage—the modified mortgage is a higher-
                                                          
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. A principal forbearance occurs when the servicer agrees to let the homeowner pay off a 
portion of the total principal amount owed a later date, usually when the loan has matured or the 
property is sold. 
 56. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 112. 
 57. Id. at 114. 
 58. See id.; see also Shahien Nasiripour, Obama’s HAMP Initiative Struggling to Help Home-
owners, HUFFINGTON POST (July 24, 2013, 11:37 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/24/ 
obama-hamp-mortgage_n_3644187.html (“Treasury data” shows that “about one in seven HAMP 
modifications feature principal forgiveness”). 
 59. See Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 196. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Arcadia Corbett, Demystifying Net Present Value (Aug. 21, 2013) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with Access to Justice Institute, Seattle University School of Law). 
 62. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 196. 
 63. For a more in-depth look at inputs, see Corbett, supra note 61. 
 64. Id. 
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valued investment than the foreclosed home—then the modification 
passes the NPV test, and the servicer must approve the loan modifica-
tion.65 The servicer has discretion to approve a modification if it fails the 
NPV test.66 
4. The Trial Period Plan 
After submitting a complete loan modification application, under-
going the waterfall approach, and passing the NPV test, the homeowner 
is approved for a loan modification.67 Nonetheless, the servicer wants to 
be assured that the homeowner is willing and able to make timely mort-
gage payments.68 The servicer arranges a TPP where the homeowner 
makes a minimum of three payments that are at the target payment 
amount determined by the waterfall approach.69 The benefits of a TPP 
include a continued stay of foreclosure proceedings and a reduced 
monthly mortgage payment.70 However, homeowners should be aware 
that TPPs have credit consequences, as the homeowner is not submitting 
full mortgage payments as required under the original, still-valid mort-
gage loan contract.71 The homeowner must submit the payments on time 
or the loan modification application will be rejected.72 If the homeowner 
submits three or more timely TPP payments, then the servicer should 
offer the homeowner a permanent loan modification.73 The permanent 
loan modification may include a slightly lower or higher monthly mort-
gage payment than the TPP payment, as any changes in the homeowner’s 
financial situation are accounted for in the permanent loan modifica-
tion.74 
5. The Permanent Loan Modification 
Upon completion of a TPP, the servicer is required to offer the 
homeowner a permanent loan modification.75 Once the permanent loan 
                                                          
 65. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 122–23. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 126. 
 68. See id. at 127. 
 69. Id. at 126–27. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See, e.g., Wigod v. Wells Fargo, 673 F.3d 547, 574 (7th Cir. 2012) (alleging that home-
owner suffered credit consequences from making TPP payments). 
 72. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 127. 
 73. Id. This should happen but is not always the case. A large source of HAMP litigation 
comes when completed TPPs fail to result in permanent modifications. See, e.g., Wigod, 673 F.3d 
547. 
 74. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 130–31. 
 75. Id. 
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modification is signed and executed, the homeowner becomes current on 
their mortgage loan and submits monthly payments to the servicer that 
are typically around 31% of the homeowner’s monthly income.76 Home-
owners save a median average of $543 per month after executing a per-
manent loan modification.77 
D. Violation of HAMP Guidelines 
In the pursuit of obtaining a HAMP loan modification, homeowners 
face many hurdles placed by the servicer resulting in a delayed process, a 
wrongful denial, or both, of the loan modification application. This can 
occur for a variety of reasons, including the servicer’s violation of 
HAMP Guidelines.78 Participating servicers have a contractual obligation 
to follow HAMP Guidelines through their SPA.79 HAMP Guidelines do 
not have the force of law,80 but homeowners have a few different outlets 
for remedies when their servicer violates HAMP Guidelines. First, 
homeowners may “escalate” their case through the Treasury Depart-
ment’s MHA Help or the HAMP Solution Center.81 The purpose of these 
programs is to work “with the servicer to identify and resolve the case in 
a manner consistent with MHA program guidelines.”82 The MHA Help 
or HAMP Solution Center contacts the servicer and then provides the 
homeowner with an explanation.83 However, this option does not have 
the force of law and typically only provides information to the home-
owner. Similar to the MHA Help and HAMP Solution Center, the Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau also has a complaint system that al-
lows homeowners to receive information from their servicer.84 Again, 
this option does not have the force of law.85 Finally, homeowners may 
bring their situation to their state’s Attorney General, as the National 
Mortgage Settlement reinforces obligations on certain servicers to follow 
the HAMP Guidelines.86 The National Mortgage Settlement is outside 
                                                          
 76. Id. 
 77. HAMP SUMMARY, supra note 14. 
 78. Kiel, supra note 5 (for example, some servicers allegedly engage in deceptive behavior by 
sending mass “blitz” denials, regardless of a homeowner’s actual eligibility). 
 79. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 23. 
 80. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 197. 
 81. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 60–63. 
 82. Id. at 60. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Joint State–Federal National Mortgage Servicing Settlement FAQ, JOINT STATE–FEDERAL 
NAT’L MORTG. SERVICING SETTLEMENTS, http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/faq (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2014). 
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the scope of this paper. A third option to resolve HAMP violations is 
through litigation. Litigation of any issue regarding the mortgage loan 
cannot disqualify a homeowner for a HAMP loan modification.87 Viola-
tions of HAMP guidelines have been litigated in federal (including bank-
ruptcy) and state courts under a wide array of claims and with a wide 
array of outcomes. 
III. A HISTORY OF HAMP LITIGATION 
Homeowners brought early HAMP cases under three legal theories: 
(1) private right of action in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
(EESA); (2) breach of contract as third-party beneficiaries of a SPA; and 
(3) procedural due process rights. However, none of these approaches 
have proved successful. 
A. Private Right of Action 
State and federal courts have universally held that HAMP does not 
include a private right of action.88 In Marks v. Bank of America, a home-
owner filed suit against her servicer, claiming that the servicer violated 
HAMP Guidelines and wrongfully foreclosed on her property. 89  The 
homeowner argued that there was congressional intent for homeowners 
to have enforceable rights against their servicers under HAMP, as the 
program’s overarching purpose is to protect the property interests of at-
risk homeowners against unnecessary foreclosures. 90  The homeowner 
also argued that there is no explicit preclusion to a private right of action 
for homeowners in the EESA or HAMP Guidelines.91 The court disa-
greed and held that “nowhere in the HAMP Guidelines, nor in the EESA, 
does it expressly provide for a private right of action.”92 The court rea-
soned that because EESA gave compliance authority to other entities, 
judicial review of HAMP violations under a private right of action would 
not comply with legislative intent. 93  This holding is common, 94  and 
HAMP cases should not be litigated under this theory. 
                                                          
 87. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 74. 
 88 . See, e.g., Marks v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 03:10-CV-08039-PHX-JAT, 2010 WL 
2572988 (D. Ariz. June 22, 2010). 
 89. Id. at *1. 
 90. Response to Motion to Dismiss at *7–9, Marks v. Bank of Am., N.A., 03:10-CV-08039-
PHX-JAT, 2010 WL 2572988 (D. Ariz. June 22, 2010), 2010 WL 3416138. 
 91. Id. at *16. 
 92. Marks, 2010 WL 2572988, at *6. 
 93. Id. at *6–7. 
 94. See, e.g., Vida v. OneWest Bank, F.S.B., No. Civ. No. 10–987–AC, 2010 WL 5148473 (D. 
Or. Dec. 13, 2010); Hoffman v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C 10-2171 SI, 2010 WL 2635773 (N.D. 
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B. Third-Party Beneficiaries 
Courts have also rejected the theory that homeowners can litigate 
against servicers as third-party beneficiaries of the SPAs.95 SPAs create a 
contractual obligation between the Treasury Department and a participat-
ing servicer to follow HAMP Guidelines.96 For a person to qualify as a 
third-party beneficiary, generally, the person must show that the con-
tracting parties created a promise with the intention of benefiting said 
third person.97 In addition, courts have added a reasonableness element 
for government contracts.98 In Escobedo v. Countrywide Home Loans, 
Inc., a homeowner sued under the third-party beneficiary theory and 
claimed his servicer failed to approve his loan modification application 
even though he qualified under HAMP.99 The court held that the home-
owner was not a third-party beneficiary because it would be unreasona-
ble for the homeowner to rely on the promises in the servicer’s SPA.100 
Furthermore, the court reasoned that the SPAs only require servicers to 
consider homeowners for loan modifications with no requirement to ac-
tually modify mortgages.101 
Similarly, In re Bank of America Home Affordable Modification 
Program (HAMP) Contract Litigation involved a class of homeowners 
suing under a third-party beneficiary theory.102 The Massachusetts Dis-
trict Court stated: “In determining whether a plaintiff is a third-party 
beneficiary to a government contract, courts must first determine whether 
the contract intended to provide the plaintiff with a legal cause of action, 
not merely whether the plaintiff is within the class the contract was in-
tended to benefit.”103 The court held that the homeowners were not third-
party beneficiaries, finding no evidence that Congress intended the SPA 
                                                                                                                                  
Cal. June 30, 2010); Manabat v. Sierra Pac. Mortg. Co., CV F 10-1018 LJO JLT, 2010 WL 2574161 
(E.D. Cal. June 25, 2010). 
 95. Escobedo v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 09CV1557 BTM(BLM), 2009 WL 
4981618, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2009). 
 96. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 23. 
 97. See Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618, at *2, *6–7; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
302 (1979). 
 98. Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618, at *6–7. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at *3. 
 101. Id. 
 102. In re Bank of Am. Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) Contract Litig., No. 
CIV.A.10-MD-02193-RWZ, 2011 WL 2637222, at *1 (D. Mass. July 6, 2011) (finding no intent to 
create private right of action for third-party beneficiaries). 
 103. See id. at *3; see generally Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cnty., Cal., 131 S. Ct. 1342 
(2011). 
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to provide homeowners with a private right of action.104 Precedent has 
uniformly held that homeowners are not third-party beneficiaries of 
HAMP.105 
C. Procedural Due Process 
Finally, courts have held that HAMP does not expand homeowners’ 
procedural due process rights.106 In Williams v. Timothy F. Geithner, 
plaintiff homeowners argued that HAMP Guidelines created a right to a 
loan modification, and thus created a property interest.107 The homeown-
ers claimed that they were deprived of this property interest by their ser-
vicers without the procedural due process right of notice.108 Homeowners 
additionally argued that HAMP Guidelines supplemented this procedural 
due process right of notice with specific notice duties for servicers.109 
The court ruled against the homeowners, declaring that HAMP did not 
create any property interests in addition to the property interests inherent 
in the homeowners’ mortgage loan contracts.110 The court reasoned that 
there was no absolute right to a loan modification guaranteed under a 
plain language reading of the HAMP Guidelines: “It is not ‘language of 
an unmistakably mandatory character.’”111 In conclusion, HAMP Guide-
lines provide no additional procedural due process rights to homeown-
ers.112 
D. Current HAMP Litigation 
After the failure of the private right of action, third-party benefi-
ciary theories, and procedural due process claims, HAMP litigation be-
gan to turn to common law and state statutory claims.113 Litigation under 
torts claims such as negligence, fraud, misrepresentation, and infliction 
of emotional distress, in addition to breach of contract claims—outside 
                                                          
 104. In re Bank of Am. Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) Contract Litig., 2011 
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of the SPA context—began to fill the courts.114 These claims have had 
mixed results.115 
Breach of contract claims have become one of the most prevalent 
and successful trends in HAMP litigation.116 In a landmark Seventh Cir-
cuit case, Wigod v. Wells Fargo, the homeowner entered a TPP agree-
ment with the servicer.117 The terms of the TPP agreement provided that 
the servicer would permanently modify the homeowner’s mortgage upon 
completion of four timely TPP payments.118 The homeowner alleged that 
she fully complied with the terms of the TPP agreement, and the servicer 
then breached the TPP by refusing to modify her mortgage. 119  The 
homeowner sued, arguing that the TPP was a valid contract that created 
an obligation on the servicer to permanently modify her mortgage loan in 
exchange for her completion of the TPP payments.120 In considering a 
motion to dismiss, the court held that the homeowner’s allegations, if 
true, sustained a breach of contract claim against the servicer.121 The 
Ninth Circuit followed Wigod in Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and 
held that failure to permanently modify a homeowner’s mortgage loan 
after promising to do so in a TPP agreement is a breach of contract.122 
These are promising results for homeowners who reach the TPP stage, 
but servicers are changing their practices to avoid making conditional 
promises of permanent loan modifications in TPPs,123 and this legal theo-
ry can only help homeowners offered a TPP. In contrast, homeowners at 
any stage in the loan modification process are potentially able to litigate 
under consumer protection act (CPA) violations. 
IV. CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT CLAIMS IN HAMP LITIGATION 
CPAs are state statutes designed to “regulate business activities 
[and] provid[e] a more equitable balance in the relationship of consumers 
to persons conducting such activities.”124 These statutes provide relief for 
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consumers when businesses engage in unfair or deceptive acts or practic-
es that are not otherwise prohibited by statute.125 Most CPAs have inten-
tionally broad language that gives great discretion to the courts to define 
what is unfair or deceptive.126 Types of relief available vary from state to 
state, but typically include injunctive relief and actual damages.127 Ac-
tions that could be considered unfair or deceptive acts or practices in-
clude general misrepresentations and fraud.128 While misrepresentations 
and fraud may be actionable on their own, some CPA statutes provide 
that these claims do not have to meet all the common law elements of 
their name to be litigated as CPA violations.129 Additionally, some states 
limit CPA claims to actions that affect the public interest.130 This Part 
analyzes (1) the elements of a HAMP CPA claim as illustrated in a re-
cent Massachusetts case; (2) what constitutes unfair and deceptive acts or 
practices in the HAMP context; and (3) other factors considered by the 
courts when they review these CPA claims. 
A. Massachusetts and Morris v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. 
Massachusetts has seen its fair share of HAMP litigation under 
CPA claims. Massachusetts’ CPA is typical: “Unfair methods of compe-
tition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade 
or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.”131 Relief available to con-
sumers in Massachusetts includes compensatory damages, injunctive 
relief, attorneys’ costs and fees, and double or treble damages.132 “To 
prevail on a [CPA] claim, the plaintiff ‘must prove that a person who is 
engaged in trade or business committed an unfair or deceptive trade prac-
tice and that the [plaintiff] suffered a loss of money or property as a re-
sult.’”133As the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts re-
cently noted, “[C]onsumer protection statutes—and Massachusetts’ 
broadly interpreted [CPA] in particular—have become an attractive al-
ternative means of attempting to recover for alleged HAMP violations 
where no action is otherwise available.”134 
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Homeowners have successfully litigated HAMP violations under 
Massachusetts’ CPA in large number.135  For example, in Morris v. BAC 
Home Loans Servicing, L.P., the homeowners experienced financial 
hardship and defaulted on their mortgage loan.136 The homeowners sub-
mitted multiple HAMP loan modification applications to their servicer, 
Bank of America.137 According to the homeowners, Bank of America 
sent them “a non-HAMP modification agreement that did not comply 
with HAMP [G]uidelines.”138 The homeowners also claimed that Bank of 
America failed to acknowledge receipt of their loan modification appli-
cation and failed to respond to their application in a timely manner.139 If 
true, all are clear violations of HAMP Guidelines.140 The homeowners 
filed suit, alleging, among other claims, that Bank of America engaged in 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices by violating specific HAMP Guide-
lines.141 
The court reasoned that violations of HAMP Guidelines are not per 
se CPA violations, but the violations can be used as evidence of a CPA 
violation if the alleged action is independently unfair or deceptive.142 
Under this standard, the homeowners had to prove three elements: (1) 
that Bank of America engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices; (2) 
that the homeowners suffered loss or injury; and (3) that loss or injury 
was proximately caused by Bank of America’s actions.143 
For the first element, the homeowners argued that violating HAMP 
Guidelines was an unfair practice, as Bank of America has made repre-
sentations to the public (via its SPA) that it would abide by these guide-
lines.144 For the second element, the homeowners alleged that they suf-
fered loss or injury by the damage to their credit, the loss of time spent 
preparing the loan modification application (in some instances, submit-
ting the application multiple times), the accumulating interest, and the 
unnecessary initiation of foreclosure action by Bank of America.145 For 
the third element, the homeowners argued that Bank of America’s failure 
to timely evaluate the homeowners for HAMP was the proximate cause 
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of the wrongful continuation of foreclosure proceedings and substantial 
arrearages.146 
The court held that if the facts alleged were true, Bank of America 
engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices by repeatedly failing to 
respond to the homeowners’ complete loan modification applications.147 
The court agreed with the homeowners that Bank of America agreed to 
consider loan modification applications in its SPA and failing to do so 
was inherently unfair.148 This was a great victory for homeowners. This 
result, however, is not universal, and courts continually redefine what 
HAMP violations are considered unfair or deceptive. 
B. HAMP Violations as Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices 
In the HAMP context, the staple of any CPA claim is proof that the 
servicer engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices. As most CPAs 
do not statutorily define “unfair” or “deceptive,” courts have broad dis-
cretion to determine whether a HAMP violation supports a CPA claim. 
However, several HAMP cases have given guidance as to which viola-
tions of HAMP Guidelines are considered unfair or deceptive.149 
1. What Actions are Unfair or Deceptive? 
Violations of some HAMP Guidelines have been successfully liti-
gated as unfair or deceptive. These violations include: 
1. “instructing mortgagors to stop making mortgage payments 
with the false assurance that doing so will not hurt their 
credit scores and is a necessary step in obtaining a loan 
modification;” 
2. “misrepresenting the status of loan modification applica-
tions;” 
3. “misrepresenting the status of mortgagors’ accounts;” and 
4. “refusing to put statements in writing when asked.”150 
Furthermore, misrepresentations about HAMP eligibility require-
ments, misrepresentations about a modification complying with HAMP, 
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and failure to grant a permanent loan modification after completion of a 
TPP have all been considered unfair or deceptive acts or practices. 
Misrepresenting that a homeowner must be in default in order to 
apply for a loan application is an unfair act.151 In Fletcher v. OneWest 
Bank, the servicer allegedly told the homeowner that she must default on 
her mortgage loan in order to apply for a HAMP loan modification.152 
The homeowner argued that this misrepresentation was unfair and decep-
tive, as she relied upon it and purposefully defaulted on her mortgage.153 
The servicer responded that, if true, this was a misrepresentation of law, 
not fact, and the homeowner could not have reasonably been expected to 
rely on this statement.154 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois refused to dismiss the CPA claim because it disagreed with the 
servicer’s characterization of the statement as a misrepresentation of 
law.155 The court reasoned: 
Depending on how the statement was worded, it might have been a 
straightforward statement about how Fletcher could legally qualify 
for a loan modification under HAMP. However, it may have also 
been a factual statement about when OneWest would consider her 
for a loan modification. The statement would have been deceptive 
since OneWest had agreed to follow the HAMP [G]uidelines, but it 
was not necessarily a statement about what those guidelines were.156 
Misrepresenting that a loan modification complies with HAMP 
Guidelines can also be unfair or deceptive.157 In Sutcliffe v. Wells Fargo, 
the homeowner argued that the servicer engaged in unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices by offering the homeowner a loan modification that did 
not comply with HAMP Guidelines.158 In holding that the facts alleged a 
sufficient CPA violation, the court reasoned that the homeowner could 
have reasonably “understood [the loan modification] as offering a trial 
plan that complied with HAMP when in fact, it did not.”159  
Failing to grant a permanent modification after completion of a TPP 
can also result in a CPA violation.160 In Okoye v. Bank of New York 
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Mellon, the homeowners alleged that their servicer violated HAMP 
Guidelines by failing to modify the homeowners’ mortgage after suc-
cessful completion of a TPP and after several representations by the ser-
vicer promising such action. 161  Furthermore, HAMP Guidelines pro-
scribe the result promised by the servicer.162 The court allowed the claim 
to survive summary judgment.163 The legally significant fact here was 
not that a HAMP Guideline proscribed completion of a TPP shall result 
in a permanent loan modification, but that the servicer made a represen-
tation about such a result.164 The court considered this misrepresentation 
independently unfair.165 
2. What Actions Are Not Unfair or Deceptive? 
Courts have little patience for litigation of technical violations of 
HAMP and summarily dismiss complaints that allege only these types of 
violations.166 Examples include clerical errors that resulted in wrongfully 
sent notices or untimely reviews of a loan modification application.167 
“[D]ecisions generally have required allegations of more than mere tech-
nical violations and clerical errors to support a [CPA] claim predicated 
on HAMP violation.”168 This only reinforces the principle that any viola-
tion of a HAMP Guideline is not necessarily unfair or deceptive.169 
C. Other Considerations 
In addition to the general requirements of CPA claims, courts con-
sider several other factors to determine whether a CPA claim based on 
HAMP violations should be dismissed.170 For example, Massachusetts 
developed its own set of elements for addressing these claims: 
(1) [H]ave plaintiffs adequately plead that defendant violated 
HAMP; (2) are those violations of the type that would be inde-
pendently actionable conduct under chapter 93A [Massachusetts’ 
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CPA] even absent violation of a statutory provision (i.e. are the vio-
lations unfair or deceptive); and (3) if the conduct is actionable, is 
recovery pursuant to chapter 93A compatible with the “objectives 
and enforcement mechanisms” of HAMP?171 
These three elements, well established in Massachusetts, are also 
found in variants throughout most of the successfully litigated HAMP 
CPA claims.172 This section focuses on these common elements of suc-
cessful HAMP CPA cases: (1) violations of HAMP guidelines as evi-
dence of the action being unfair or deceptive; (2) actions being pleaded 
as unfair or deceptive independent of HAMP; and (3) policy rationale for 
HAMP CPA litigation. 
1. Violations of HAMP Guidelines as Evidence 
Although CPAs vary as to whether the unfair act must be “tethered” 
to a statutory provision or agency regulation, pleading specific violations 
of HAMP Guidelines is persuasive in any jurisdiction.173 In CPAs with-
out a tethering requirement, courts have considered violations of HAMP 
Guidelines as evidence that an act or practice is inherently unfair or de-
ceptive.174 “Violations of agency directives like [HAMP] can be a hall-
mark of unfairness under the [CPA].”175 In contrast, homeowners in ju-
risdictions requiring “tethering” must show specific actions that violate 
HAMP Guidelines.176 For example, a recent Sixth Circuit case required 
that the homeowner specify particular violations of HAMP Guidelines in 
his pleadings for the CPA claim to proceed.177 Because of the weight 
given to tethered claims, homeowners should always specify particular 
violations of HAMP Guidelines in their allegations regardless of a juris-
diction’s tethering requirements. 
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2. Independently Unfair and Deceptive 
Many courts require the homeowner show that the servicer’s ac-
tions, pleaded as HAMP violations, are unfair or deceptive in their own 
right, independent of HAMP.178 These courts agree with servicers’ pri-
vate right of action arguments, but still reason that servicers cannot be 
“wholly immunized for their conduct so long as the subject transaction is 
associated with HAMP.”179 This allows homeowners to litigate against 
servicers for significant grievances such as the failure to consider the 
homeowner for a loan modification or violating a TPP agreement.180 The 
degree of independence required varies by court, with some requiring 
complete independence181 and other courts using violations of HAMP as 
evidence of unfairness, mentioned above.182 
Misrepresentations are independently actionable. 183  In Okoye v. 
Bank of New York Mellon, the servicer allegedly represented that home-
owners would be offered a permanent loan modification if they complied 
with the terms of the TPP agreement.184 The homeowners complied with 
the terms of the TPP, but the servicer refused to offer them a permanent 
loan modification.185 The court sustained the CPA claim.186 It reasoned 
“HAMP violations can give rise to a viable [CPA] claim if the activity 
would be independently actionable under [the CPA] as unfair and decep-
tive.”187 The court noted that the “[servicer’s] denial of the [homeown-
er’s] application for loan modification itself may not amount to unfair or 
deceptive practices action under [the CPA], and indeed may not even 
allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that any HAMP Guidelines were 
violated.”188 However, the court reasoned that the alleged misrepresenta-
tion regarding the promise of a permanent loan modification was enough 
to substantiate a CPA claim, as misrepresentations are generally actiona-
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ble under CPAs.189 Thus, the homeowner effectively established inde-
pendence.190 
3. Policy Rationale 
Finally, courts address whether allowing litigation to continue 
would be consistent with HAMP’s purposes, with overwhelmingly suc-
cessful results for homeowners and consumer advocates.191 Courts look 
primarily to HAMP for the purpose of: “help[ing] homeowners avoid 
foreclosure by obtaining loan modifications.”192 Specifically, it can be 
“assume[d] that one purpose of Congress in enacting the 2008 Act [the 
EESA] was to ensure mortgage servicers participated in the foreclosure 
mitigation programs [i.e., HAMP] it empowered the Treasury Depart-
ment to set up.”193 HAMP Guidelines protect homeowners from servic-
ing misconduct, and as such, courts should allow CPA litigation to ad-
dress violations of HAMP Guidelines because it furthers the general pur-
pose of HAMP and EESA. 
V. CHALLENGES TO HAMP CPA LITIGATION 
HAMP litigation continues to face many challenges as the program 
grows. As homeowners change their litigation strategies, servicers con-
tinue to raise new challenges. First, servicers consistently raise preemp-
tion challenges. 194  Second, servicers argue that homeowners disguise 
HAMP violations as CPA claims to circumvent the commonly held prin-
ciple that there is no private right of action in EESA.195 Finally, courts 
routinely dismiss HAMP litigation for failure to properly plead causa-
tion, especially when homeowners defaulted on their mortgage loan be-
fore applying for a modification.196 This section addresses all three major 
arguments presented by servicers and discusses why the courts should 
reject each. 
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A. Preemption 
“Preemption can take on three different forms: express preemption, 
field preemption, and conflict preemption.”197 Express preemption is typ-
ically not raised in HAMP litigation cases, as the statutory language in 
EESA does not speak to this issue.198 Therefore, this section focuses on 
field preemption and conflict preemption. 
Field preemption “occurs when ‘federal regulation [is] so pervasive 
that the only reasonable inference is that [Congress] meant to displace 
the states’ from their own regulation.”199 Servicers typically argue that 
EESA or the Home Owners Loan Act (HOLA) occupies the field of loan 
modifications or mortgage lending, respectively.200 Courts should reject 
this argument because HAMP targets a small subset of homeowners—
primarily those who were victims of subprime lending prior to 2009.201 
Furthermore, servicers offer loan modifications outside HAMP.202 “Ser-
vicers and [homeowners remain] free to modify home loans under com-
mon law principles of contracts or pursuant to other federal, state, or lo-
cal programs,” and as such, “HAMP does not preempt the field of home 
loan modification.” 203  Additionally, courts should reject any HOLA 
preemption argument. The Treasury Department declared that it 
“occup[ied] the entire field of lending regulation for federal savings as-
sociations” under HOLA. 204  However, in the same declaration, the 
Treasury Department acknowledged, 
[S]tate tort, contract, and commercial laws are “not preempted to 
the extent that they only incidentally affect the lending operations of 
Federal savings associations or are otherwise consistent with the 
purposes of [HOLA].”205 
Furthermore, in Wigod, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that HOLA does 
not give the Treasury Department authority to “adjudicate disputes” be-
tween servicers and homeowners.206 Thus, like EESA, courts should fol-
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low the Seventh Circuit approach and hold that HOLA does not preempt 
HAMP litigation.207 
Servicers also raise conflict preemption challenges. Conflict 
preemption occurs when it is impossible to comply with both state and 
federal law, or when state law is in conflict with the purposes of the fed-
eral law.208 Courts should reject the conflict preemption challenge be-
cause there is nothing preventing servicers from complying with both 
HAMP Guidelines and state consumer protection acts as the SPAs im-
pose a contractual obligation on servicers to comply with state and feder-
al law along with HAMP Guidelines.209 In addition, precedent exists in 
the Seventh Circuit to reject conflict preemption arguments.210 In Wigod, 
the court reasoned that CPAs impose no additional obligations on ser-
vicers beyond their duties imposed by HAMP.211 “Where federal law 
supplies the standard of care imposed by state law, it is hard to see how 
they could conflict.”212 Therefore, courts should reject servicers’ field 
and conflict preemption arguments by citing to the Treasury Depart-
ment’s intent in EESA and HOLA and by citing to servicers’ contractual 
obligations in the SPAs. 
B. Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing 
The crux of servicers’ defenses against CPA claims is that home-
owners use CPAs as cover for the lack of a private right of action in 
EESA.213 In other words, servicers argue that CPA claims are a “wolf in 
sheep’s clothing.”214 Servicers successfully made this argument in Vida 
v. OneWest Bank, F.S.B., where the district court in Oregon “explained 
that state common law claims cannot be used to enforce federal program 
provisions.”215 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
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fornia also followed this approach.216 However, this appears to be a mi-
nority view, as the First, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have each allowed 
common law claims based on HAMP violations.217 
Courts should reject the reasoning in Vida, even when homeowners 
fail to sufficiently plead that the servicer misconduct is independently 
unfair or deceptive. The purpose of CPAs is to protect consumers against 
conduct that is otherwise not necessarily actionable.218 HAMP Guide-
lines do not provide for a private right of action, yet violations of these 
guidelines—such as telling the homeowner to default on their mortgage 
to obtain a loan modification—are inherently unfair. Therefore, while 
homeowners make their strongest case by properly pleading servicer 
misconduct is unfair or deceptive in its own right, courts should nonethe-
less reject the “wolf in sheep’s clothing” argument. 
C. CAUSATION 
Finally, many homeowners have difficulty proving causation.219 
Homeowners must establish that their servicers proximately caused some 
type of injury, such as wrongful foreclosure proceedings (including loss 
of the foreclosed home), damage to the homeowner’s credit, loss of al-
ternatives to foreclosure, and additional and unnecessary fees throughout 
the prolonged foreclosure process.220 
Jurisdictions are currently split on what constitutes causation in this 
context. Particularly, some courts are unsympathetic when the home-
owners defaulted on their mortgage loan before applying for a modifica-
tion.221 For example, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California rejected a CPA claim alleging the servicer violated HAMP 
Guidelines and caused the homeowner to lose her home to foreclosure.222 
The court reasoned the “plaintiff lost her home because she defaulted on 
the loan, not because of defendants’ alleged representations that defend-
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ants would approve plaintiff for a loan modification.”223 This line of rea-
soning rests blame on the homeowner, and it fails to acknowledge any 
potential servicer misconduct that contributed to the injury. Additionally, 
this reasoning fails to acknowledge HAMP’s purpose—preventing fore-
closure even in cases where the homeowner is in default. 
Courts should reject Ortiz and instead acknowledge that servicer 
misconduct proximately causes homeowners injury by extending the loan 
modification process, increasing the amount in arrears, and in some cases 
actually causing the homeowner to default.224 For example, courts should 
find causation when repetitive violations of HAMP Guidelines cause loss 
of equity in a home and damage to credit ratings.225 In In re JPMorgan 
Chase Mortgage Modification Litigation, a class action alleged the ser-
vicer violated Massachusetts’ CPA by violating HAMP Guidelines.226 
The court explored two different classes of homeowners and their causa-
tion arguments.227  One group of homeowners alleged that they owed 
more on their mortgages after participating in the loan modification pro-
cess than what they would have owed if they did not participate in 
HAMP.228 The second group of homeowners alleged that they would 
have financially benefited more from being foreclosed upon immediately 
rather than foreclosed upon after participating in HAMP.229 The court 
allowed both claims to survive a motion to dismiss.230 The court reasoned 
that both sets of homeowners had plausible claims as servicer miscon-
duct could prolong the loan modification process and cause homeowners 
to incur late fees, additional interest, and other foreclosure-related fees 
that the homeowner would not have incurred otherwise.231 
VI. CONCLUSION 
HAMP litigation is an emerging area of law. As the foreclosure cri-
sis lingers, homeowners must continually evolve their litigation strate-
gies to address servicer violations of HAMP Guidelines. Consumer pro-
tection acts provide one outlet for HAMP litigation, and homeowners can 
successfully bring claims under this theory by adequately pleading that 
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their servicer engaged in an unfair or deceptive act or practice. Servicers’ 
litigation strategies will also continue to evolve, and homeowners must 
continue to be creative in their responses. However, courts should allow 
the broad language of CPAs to provide a remedy for homeowners when 
servicers violate HAMP Guidelines and enforce the policy behind CPAs 
to protect consumers, and more particularly, homeowners, from unfair or 
deceptive acts and practices of mortgage servicers. 
